Fishing Privileges or Privileged  Fishermen ? Federal Catch Share Policy by Cramer, Jack
SUNY College of Environmental Science and Forestry 
Digital Commons @ ESF 
Dissertations and Theses 
Spring 3-19-2019 




Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.esf.edu/etds 
 Part of the Aquaculture and Fisheries Commons, and the Natural Resources Management and Policy 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Cramer, Jack, "Fishing Privileges or Privileged "Fishermen"? Federal Catch Share Policy" (2019). 
Dissertations and Theses. 80. 
https://digitalcommons.esf.edu/etds/80 
This Open Access Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ ESF. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ ESF. For 




FISHING PRIVILEGES OR PRIVILEGED “FISHERMEN”? 




submitted in partial fulfillment 
of the requirements for the  
Master of Science Degree 
State University of New York 
College of Environmental Science and Forestry 













Karin E. Limburg, Major Professor 
Theodore Dibble, Chair, Examining Committee 
Russel Briggs, Division Chair 



















































I would like to thank McKenzie Long for her copyediting assistance, graphic design advice, and 
unwavering support throughout the writing process. I’m also grateful for my parents, David and 
Kathleen Cramer, whose expectations and encouragement ensured I had the desire and 
confidence to finish my degree. My classmates, Mike Petroni and Chris Tomlinson, provided 
insightful feedback while I was formulating and conducting my research that is thoroughly 
appreciated. I’m also thankful for my steering committee and defense chair—Glenn-Marie 
Lange, Nehan Naim, Matthew Huber, and Theodore Dibble—who offered thoughtful critiques 
that greatly improved this document. 
 
Finally, I would like to thank my advisor, Karin Limburg, who is a better teacher, mentor, and 
friend than I deserve.   
iv 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................................... v 
LIST OF FIGURES ....................................................................................................................... vi 
Abstract ..................................................................................................................................... vii 
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................................. 1 
The Race for Fish and Rent Dissipation ............................................................................. 1 
US Catch Share History ...................................................................................................... 3 
Resource Rent from Catch Shares ...................................................................................... 6 
METHODS ........................................................................................................................... 11 
Resource Rent Estimation ................................................................................................. 11 
Allocation Criteria, Allocation Recipients, and Quota Leasing Activity ......................... 16 
RESULTS ............................................................................................................................. 18 
Resource Rent Model Evaluation ..................................................................................... 18 
The Distribution of Resource Rent ................................................................................... 21 
DISCUSSION ....................................................................................................................... 27 
Resource Rent Estimation ................................................................................................. 27 
Quota Leasing Activity, Initial Allocation Criteria, and Allocation Recipients ............... 29 
CONCLUSION ..................................................................................................................... 36 
DATA SOURCES ............................................................................................................ 38 
SUPPLEMENTAL RESULTS ......................................................................................... 41 
LITERATURE CITED ..................................................................................................... 44 






LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Theoretical distribution of resource rent under catch shares . .......................................... 7 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for quota lease price and the explanatory variables. ..................... 15 
Table 3. Pooled OLS, fixed quota market effects, and random effects models of logged quota 
lease prices ..................................................................................... Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Table 4. The definition of leasing activity used in each quota market in Figure 5. ...................... 25 
Table 5. Federal revenue from assorted natural resources in 2015. .............................................. 32 
Table 6. The quota markets and data sources used for resource rent estimation. ......................... 38 
Table 7. Comparison between random effects models using the full dataset (n = 84) and only the 





LIST OF FIGURES 
Figure 1. Timeline of federal catch share development .................................................................. 5 
Figure 2. Log of annual lease price versus log of annual ex-vessel price. .. Error! Bookmark not 
defined. 
Figure 3. Criteria used to allocate catch shares for existing federal programs, weighted by 
baseline program revenue. ............................................................. Error! Bookmark not defined. 
Figure 4. Recipients of catch share allocations for existing federal programs ... Error! Bookmark 
not defined. 
Figure 5. Assorted measures of leasing activity for ten of the twenty-five federal quota market 25 
Figure 6. The fishing year used to calculate catch history weighted by baseline program. ......... 35 
Figure 7. Predictive margins of the allocation landed dummy variable for examining its 
interaction with logged ex-vessel price......................................................................................... 41 






J.A.Cramer. Fishing Privileges or Privileged “Fishermen”? Federal Catch Share Policy. 55 
pages, 7 tables, 8 figures, 2018. APA style guide used. 
 
Catch shares are a fishery management tool that assign the exclusive privilege to harvest a 
specific quantity of fish to different fishery participants. An increase in resource rent is 
considered a primary benefit of catch shares, and its overall level is an indicator of the economic 
performance of a fishery. Despite substantial expansion in the use of this management tool in the 
US, however, the size and distribution of rent remains poorly understood. Using a multiple 
regression model of quota lease prices, resource rent in federal catch share programs is estimated 
to be $690 million, or roughly half of annual revenues. Theory suggests when fishing privileges 
are assigned for free, as they have been in federal programs, resource rent will accrue largely to 
the initial recipient of the privileges as a windfall gain. An examination of past recipients reveals 
considerable homogeneity, with an overwhelming majority distributed to vessel or permit owners 
based on historical landings. These findings suggest catch shares have improved the aggregate 
economic performance of many federal fisheries, but the gains have been largely directed toward 
a narrow group of fishery participants.  
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The Race for Fish and Rent Dissipation 
A little more than a half century ago, American fisheries beyond state waters were 
regarded as open access resources where domestic and foreign vessels could operate with few 
restrictions. This changed in 1976 when the US formally declared sovereignty over marine 
resources extending out to 200 nautical miles from its coastline. In the decades following, 
foreign vessels were expelled, and federal fisheries became increasingly managed as regulated 
open access or regulated restricted access resources. These traditional fisheries management 
systems use a variety of regulations, such as fishing seasons, gear restrictions, spatial boundaries, 
and limited entry, to attempt to restrict fishing effort. By restricting effort managers hope to 
achieve overall harvests near a level believed to be ecologically sustainable and economically 
desirable. This level is termed the total allowable catch (TAC). However, when individual 
fishermen are faced with a fleetwide TAC and effort restrictions they are incentivized to compete 
with one another to catch as many fish as possible until the overall TAC is reached. This 
competition manifests itself in a wasteful “race for fish” characterized by increasing effort in the 
aspects of fishing that remain unregulated, including excess investment in fishing vessels and 
technology, the employment of redundant labor, and greater fishing intensity during the brief 
seasons when it is allowed. As a consequence, the cost of fishing is raised [1] [2], there is 
pressure to fish even when weather conditions are dangerous [3], and the resource itself can be 
harmed by accidental TAC overages [4], poor handling of bycatch species [5] [6], and other 
ecologically damaging fishing practices [7].  
An increasingly popular alternative to traditional management, known as catch shares, 
tries to end the “race for fish” by assigning exclusive privileges to harvest specific quantities of 
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fish. Like traditional management, an overall TAC is first set by managers based on economic 
and ecologic considerations. The TAC is then divided into smaller portions, or shares, that are 
allocated to fishery participants and convey the privilege to catch a specific percentage of the 
TAC. The exclusivity of these privileges gives shareholders the flexibility to choose the time and 
intensity of their fishing effort. This has led to improved safety [8], higher productivity [9], and 
more stable landings in many fisheries [10]. In addition, if the fishing privileges are transferrable 
and granted for a long duration, shares can become valuable and a financial incentive can grow 
for shareholders to practice good stewardship. These perceived benefits have led to the 
increasing adoption of catch shares over recent decades. Worldwide, approximately 25% of 
fisheries are now managed in this way [11]. This proliferation, however, has not occurred 
without controversy. Catch share management is associated with fleet consolidation and 
corresponding job losses [12]. Share allocations can disrupt the cultural structure of traditional 
fishing communities [13] and high share prices can present a sizeable barrier to entry for future 
fishermen [14]. Further, the theorized stewardship benefits from share ownership remain largely 
unproven [15] and catch share implementation has thus far resulted in mixed ecological 
outcomes [10] [16] [17]. 
Although these empirical findings are often of interest to stakeholders and policymakers, 
fisheries economists have long focused on the theoretical concept of rent dissipation when 
debating catch share policies. Rent in an economic context is defined as any payment above the 
minimum needed to compensate labor or capital for production [18]. In a fisheries context, rent 
would be any surplus left after deducting the total cost of fishing from the revenue of fish sales. 
Importantly, total costs include both the actual costs to operate the vessel and pay the crew plus 
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the opportunity costa of the same capital and labor. In the competitive environment found under 
traditional management, rent is dissipated as individual fishermen rationally increase their effort 
until the marginal revenue from additional effort is equal to the marginal cost of additional effort. 
Fishermen can still expect to earn profit, but these profits are considered normal because they are 
equal only to their opportunity costs and include no additional rent.  
Under catch shares, however, the exclusivity of fishing privileges allows fishermen to 
reduce their effort and minimize costs. Faster vessels, advanced fish-finding technologies, or 
additional crew become unnecessary expenses when there is no longer a race to catch fish before 
the TAC is reached. At the same time, a longer fishing season spreads out landings which can 
negate the need to freeze or preserve large portions of the harvest and reduce the processing 
infrastructure required. A slower pace also gives fishermen time to handle the fish they catch 
more carefully. These changes often contribute to higher product quality and correspondingly 
higher prices. Thus, fishermen can expect to have both lower costs and higher revenues under 
catch shares. The expanding difference between costs and revenues is rent, which had previously 
been dissipated by the “race for fish.” Because this rent exists due to the scarcity of the fishery 
resource, it is more specifically referred to as resource rent. 
 
US Catch Share History 
Fisheries economists have repeatedly emphasized the rent dissipation under traditional 
management as a principal argument to persuade policymakers to transition to catch share 
                                                 
a Opportunity costs can be thought of as “the anticipated value of ‘that which might be’” [74]. In a fisheries context, 
this would be the expected returns if a fishing vessel and crew were employed in the ‘next best alternative’. 
Although it is difficult to identify exactly what this alternative might be—transporting goods, running whale 
watching tours, fishing in a different fishery, etc.—opportunity costs are estimated to be equal to the 5-10% normal 
profit usually earned on fisheries capital and labor [75]. 
4 
 
systems [19] [20]. This transition has unfolded in a federal fisheries landscape shaped largely by 
the Magnuson-Stevens Conservation and Management Act of 1976 (MSA) and its subsequent 
amendments. The original MSA established an exclusive economic zone within 200 nm of the 
US coastline and claimed “sovereign rights and exclusive fishery management authority over all 
fish” therein [MSA Sec. 101 (a)]. Management authority was delegated to eight Regional Fishery 
Management Councils (hereafter ‘Councils’) to be overseen by the fisheries division of the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). Councils are tasked with 
developing, monitoring, and revising Fishery Management Plans in accordance with national 
guidelines. The Mid-Atlantic Council was the first to be persuaded by the arguments for catch 
shares and implemented the first program in federal waters in 1990. The South Atlantic and 
North Pacific Councils followed with programs of their own before growing concerns over the 
social and economic effects of these policies caused Congress to place a moratorium on the 
adoption of new catch share programs in 1996. As part of this moratorium, the National 
Research Council was commissioned to study the effects of existing programs. The resulting 
report, Sharing the Fish, acknowledged legitimate concerns but suggested the moratorium be 
lifted [21]. Additional recommendations were provided for new or existing programs to ensure 
better design, implementation, operation, and oversight to achieve management objectives. 
Congress obliged and lifted the national moratorium in 2002. However, before this occurred two 
other programs had formed through separate legislative exemptions. Since the end of the 
moratorium catch, share policies have continued to spread. Today, sixteen federal catch share 
programs exist to manage more than 50 species, including many of the country’s largest and 





Figure 1. Timeline of federal catch share development. Colors indicate the Regional Fishery 
Management Councils (except for Atlantic Highly Migratory Species which is overseen directly 
by NOAA Fisheries). Bold denotes existing catch share programs. Italics, when used, indicate 
the separate quota markets some programs were divided into for this analysis. 
 
Although NOAA considers all of these “catch share” programs, there are substantial 
differences among them. Early programs largely assigned exclusive privileges to individual 
entities to catch a single species. For this reason, the first catch share programs were originally 
termed individual transferrable quota (ITQ) or individual fishing quota (IFQ) programs. Over 
time, Councils adopted other programs that allocated privileges to communities or included 
privileges for both target and bycatch species in complex multispecies fisheries. The terminology 
used for catch share policies evolved as the new designs were implemented and theory was 
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refined. What was originally referred to in the literature as ITQs, IFQs, or ‘rights-based’ fishing 
has been largely replaced by the “catch shares” umbrella term that encompasses each of the 
previous along with rationalization programs, harvesting cooperatives, and territorial use rights 
fisheries. 
 
Resource Rent from Catch Shares 
Resource rent was given substantial attention when many federal catch share programs 
were being considered [22] [23], but it has received relatively little attention since. A likely 
reason is that rent can be difficult to measure. International studies of fisheries rent have used 
detailed costs and revenue data to model it [24] [25] [26]. Unfortunately, detailed cost data are 
not routinely collected for US programs [9]. An alternative method, however, is to use the lease 
price of shares as a proxy for resource rent. Rational asset pricing theory suggests that in a 
competitive market, the price of a one-year lease of fishing privileges should equal the expected 
rent from those privileges [27] [28] [29]. By then multiplying average lease price by the TAC, 
the overall rent in a fishery can be estimated. This overall rent has been characterized as “a 
measure of success”[30] and “the best available predictor of…the true economic value” [31] of a 
fishery. Despite this importance, no attempts have been made to estimate the overall resource 
rent from federal fisheries. This stands in contrast to a considerable body of literature examining 
the value of and rent generated by other federal resources, including timber stands [32], grazing 
lands [33], and oil and gas reserves [34].  
While the magnitude of rent is important for determining the aggregate impact of catch 
share policies, the distribution of this rent is of great importance to fishery participants and is 
critical for achieving management goals. Unfortunately, untangling how rent is distributed is also 
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difficult. In most catch share fisheries, including the US, shares are granted for free, in 
perpetuity, to initial recipients who have the freedom to fish, sell, or lease their privileges on an 
annual basis. Under these circumstances rent can be captured by initial recipients directly 
through the leasing or sale of shares. Initial recipients can also capture rent if they choose to fish 
and are able to use their ownership of exclusive privileges to raise profits above opportunity 
costs. Rent, however, can also go to other fishery participants through a variety of mechanisms 
(Table 1). Secondary share buyers or lessees, for example, could receive some rent if they are 
able to negotiate below market prices to buy or lease shares. Vessel crew can capture rent for 
themselves if they are able to negotiate pay above their opportunity cost, conceivably through 
organized labor or unions.b 
 
Table 1. Theoretical distribution of resource rent under catch shares. Adapted from Flaaten 
et al. [35]. 
 
                                                 
b Flaaten et al. [35] suggest this may occur in the Icelandic ITQ system. However, evidence from the Alaska Halibut 
and BSAI Crab catch share programs suggests a “much larger percentage of the rent…went to quota owners” than to 
the crews [13]. 
Potential recipient Explanation
Initial share recipients
Rent is captured if they lease or sell grandfathered privileges, or if they fish their 
shares and profits exceed opportunity costs.
Secondary share buyers or 
lessees
Fishing privileges create no rent for secondary share holders unless they manage to 
buy/lease shares "cheaply"
Vessel crew If crew compensation rises above their opportunity cost
Fish processors
Vertically-integrated firms can move rent from vessels to processors by paying 
vessels below market prices for raw fish.
Transaction intermediaries
Quota auctioneers and traders capture rent through commissions or fees on lisitngs 
and sales
Financial institutions
Banks capture rent if share sellers deposit earnings they are able to lend to share 
buyers.
Government




Although possibilities exist for resource rent to flow to other fishery participants, initial 
recipients of shares receive a substantial portion of the rent capitalized into the value of the 
fishing privileges they receive—rational price theory suggests the price of long-term privileges 
will reflect the expected value of future rents [28].  For this reason, the initial allocation of shares 
is instrumental to the distributional impacts of these policies. Catch shares have been criticized 
for largely allocating shares gratis based on historic landings, a method commonly known as 
“grandfathering.” This practice was observed to at least some degree in 91% of 156 international 
programs [36]. Similar levels of grandfathering are commonly suspected in federal catch share 
programs, but precise statistics are not known. Critics contend that grandfathering exacerbates 
existing inequalities and results in no rent being retained by the legal owner of the resource: the 
US government [37]. Defenders of the practice, however, argue that grandfathering may be 
necessary to persuade top harvesters to support a transition to catch shares and that passing rent 
on to industry improves dynamic efficiency [38]. Regardless of whether grandfathering or a 
different method is used to divide up initial allocations, an additional question remains: once 
allocations are determined, who are shares distributed to? Many well-cited studies neglect this 
detail, relying on similar derivations of ‘privileges are granted to fishermen, communities, or 
cooperatives’ [39] [40] [41] [42].  When simplified for a mainstream audience, the recipients are 
often shortened to ‘fishermen’ [43] [44] [45]. While Carothers and Chambers [13] acknowledge 
some diversity in the initial recipients, they suggest most catch shares have actually been 
allocated to vessel owners rather than other fishery participants. If true, this would have 
important implications for the equity impacts of the federal catch share system. 
Beyond the initial allocation, which distributes the expected value of future rents, it is 
also possible to examine where existing rent is going by looking at quota leasing. Resource is not 
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static and can change depending on the ecological status of the fishery, regulatory conditions, 
and how industry responds. Under competitive conditions, though, the price to lease shares 
should represent the contemporaneous resource rent. In the absence of transaction costs, a share 
lessor would receive all the rent. By examining leasing activity, it is thus possible to determine 
the rough proportion of the rent that accrues to share lessors compared to active fishery 
participants. In the British Columbia halibut fishery, for example, 57% of the TAC is leased 
annually which indicates roughly 57% of the rent goes to quota lessors [56] [57]. This is 
perceived as profoundly unfair by some who argue that those physically engaged in fishing 
deserve to receive the rent rather than inactive “armchair fishermen”. Similar attitudes exist in 
many US fisheries but concerns about leasing extend past equity issues. Fishermen who lease 
have been observed to be more likely to fish in adverse weather conditions, possibly due to 
greater financial pressure to cover lease costs [58]. Lessee fishermen also do not experience the 
same stewardship incentives as full share owners [46]. These concerns have caused several 
Councils to consider and adopt measures to dissuade leasing. However, the extent of quota 
leasing across federal programs remains poorly understood. 
Despite many remaining unknowns there is general agreement that catch shares improve 
the aggregate economic performance of fisheries, and their prodigious expansion suggests they 
are likely here to stay. Therefore, “the central management question,” according to Macinko 
[47], is no longer whether to implement catch shares, but rather after implementation “where 
does a particular society want the rents from the fishery to flow?” This analysis will attempt to 
provide some of the information necessary for American society to tackle this question. First, 
share lease prices are used to estimate the overall resource rent from federal catch share 
programs. The distribution of this rent is then explored by examining quota leasing and the 
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criteria used and recipients of the initial allocation of fishing privileges. Finally, 
recommendations are made to achieve a more equitable distribution of rent that would more 






Resource Rent Estimation 
Total resource rent across all federal catch share programs was estimated using a multiple 
regression model of share lease prices. Explanatory variables included the average price 
fishermen receive for the catch at the dock (ex-vessel price), the proportion of the TAC that is 
landed, the change in the number of vessels operating in the fishery, and other program 
characteristics. The source for data on these variables varied among catch share programs. A 
significant portion came from formal program reviews, which are conducted every five years for 
most programs. Additional data were obtained from NOAA annual reports, academic articles, 
and online databases. For a full accounting see the Appendix (Table 6). Within these sources the 
terminology used for share transactions was inconsistent. For this analysis ‘quota shares’ (or 
‘shares’) will refer to the long-term privilege to catch a specific percentage of the overall TAC. 
‘Quota pounds’ (or ‘quota’) will refer to the annual privilege to catch the specific poundage of 
fish that corresponds to the TAC of that year. Due to other reporting and structural design 
differences, the fifteenc official catch share programs operating in 2013 were divided into 
twenty-four quota markets for analysis. The Pacific Groundfish Trawl Rationalization, for 
example, was treated as three separate markets because the shoreside whiting, shoreside non-
whiting, and offshore processing sectors are harvested by different fleets, governed by different 
regulations for quota share transfers, and report their data in different sources. Similar structural 
issues necessitated that the Alaska Halibut and Sablefish IFQ, the Atlantic Surfclam and Ocean 
                                                 
c The Atlantic Bluefin Tuna catch share program is excluded from this analysis because it was implemented in 2016. 
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Quahog IFQ, the American Fisheries Act Pollock Cooperatives, and the Western Alaska 
Community Development Quota be subdivided. 
For each market, the annual allocation and landings were aggregated, and prices were 
averaged across the various regulatory regions and species each market contained. Lease and ex-
vessel prices for all markets were converted to 2017 dollars per pound using the Bureau of 
Economic Analysis implicit GDP deflator.d Only the five most recent years of available data 
were used for each market to ensure the dataset was not heavily unbalanced toward programs 
that have been operating for longer periods of time. These decisions reduced the number of lease 
price observations from 84 to 65e, spread across 14 of the 24 identified quota markets. At least 
one market was included from each of the six Regional Management Councils where catch 
shares have been implemented. Together these markets accounted for 57% of catch share 
revenues in 2013. 
Although the objective of this analysis is ultimately to estimate the resource rent 
generated by existing federal catch share programs, the regression model used to achieve this 
does so by estimating quota lease prices. Estimated lease prices are then multiplied by the known 
TAC of each program to calculate overall resource rent [29]. This process was used because the 
limited number of recent resource rent observations (65) constrained the number of explanatory 
variables that could appropriately be included in the model. Without additional variables, it was 
not possible to capture the numerous scientific and political factors that may influence how 
TACs are set. The drawback to this approach is that future resource rents cannot be predicted. 
                                                 
d https://www.bea.gov/data/prices-inflation/gdp-price-deflator 
e For comparison, models using all 84 observations are displayed in Table 7. Comparison between random 
effects models using the full dataset (n = 84) and only the five most recent years of available data 
(n = 65). Parentheses indicate standard errors; * denotes p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.  
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However, for the years when the TAC is known it allows for a rough estimation of resource rent. 
The general equation devised for quota lease price data is 
log 𝜆𝑖𝑦 = 𝛽1 log 𝑝𝑖𝑦 + 𝛽2 𝑐𝑖𝑦 + 𝛽3 (log 𝑝𝑖𝑦 × 𝑐𝑖𝑦) + 𝛽4 𝑣𝑖 + 𝛽5 𝑠𝑖 + 𝛽6 𝑡𝑖 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑦 
where λ is the average annual lease price, p is the average annual ex-vessel price, and c is a 
dummy variable equal to one if greater than 95% of the allocation was landed. 𝛽3  represents an 
interaction between ex-vessel price and the dummy variable for allocation landed. The average 
annual change in the number of vessels between the baseline period before catch share 
implementation and 2013 is denoted v. Dummy variables for whether a program targeted 
shellfish (s) and whether quota shares were separable, divisible, and transferrable (t) were also 
included. Markets are identified by subscript i and year with y, so that each combination of iy 
indicates a particular quota market in a particular year. Individual market fixed effects are 
specified by 𝛼, and ε denotes the independently identically distributed error term. The discussion 
that follows explains why the expected signs of all coefficients except β4 are positive. 
 A significant, positive relationship was previously identified between the export price of 
fish and the quota lease price in the New Zealand quota market [28]. This relationship makes 
theoretical sense, as the price a commercial fisher would be willing to pay to catch a pound of 
fish would likely be influenced by the price that fisher expects to receive for the pound of fish 
when they sell it. A similar relationship is expected here between ex-vessel price and lease price 
because ex-vessel price better represents the revenue fishermen receive for their catch than 
export price. For federal programs a roughly linear association between the common logarithms 
of these two variables was observed (Error! Reference source not found.). For this analysis, 
leases are considered to be of a duration of one year or less, so the assumption that the 




Figure 2. Log of annual lease price versus log of annual ex-vessel price. 
 
 Beyond the lease – ex-vessel price relationship, remaining variation in the lease price 
data is expected to be accounted for by variation in harvest rates and underlying program 
characteristics. In years where landings are greater than 95% of the allocationf, lease prices are 
expected to be higher due to demand for quota becoming constrained by supply. In addition, the 
predicted positive relationship between lease and ex-vessel price is expected to be higher in 
programs with greater than 95% of the allocation landed because fishermen targeting higher 
                                                 
f The threshold for the percent of allocation landed was set at 95% as a rough means to distinguish between quota 
markets where the quota was ‘fully harvested’ from quota markets where it was not. In all model specifications, the 
percent of allocation landed variable remained statistically significant (p < 0.05) when using alternative thresholds 
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R2 = 0.8629 
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value species likely have higher profit margins and, thus, greater ability to pay a higher portion 
of the ex-vessel price for leasing. It is generally believed that fleet consolidation resulting from 
catch share implementation will reduce operating costs and improve economic efficiency, 
leading to higher resource rents [12]. Therefore, the relationship between lease price and the 
annual percent change in the number of vessels is expected to be negative. In the New Zealand 
case, shellfish quota markets were found to have higher quota share prices, possibly due to 
higher precision when measuring shellfish stock biomass which would reduce uncertainty about 
future allocations [48]. Higher quota share prices are expected to push the price to lease those 
shares higher and result in a positive relationship between lease price and shellfish quota 
markets. A variety of vessel and ownership restrictions on quota leasing in the Alaska Halibut 
and Sablefish quota markets were shown to reduce total program resource rent [29]. A broader 
characterization of quota ownership restrictions—whether quota shares are separable, divisible, 
and transferrable—is expected to have a positive association with lease price because treating 
privileges this way gives quota owners greater flexibility when trading, which should increase 
participation in quota markets and raise demand. Reasonable variation was observed for all 
variables included in the model (Table 2). 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics for quota lease price and the explanatory variables.  
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Lease price ($/lbs) 1.27 1.18 0.01 4.33
Ex-vessel price ($/lbs) 3.49 3.25 0.08 13.40
Landings > 95% of allocation (dummy) 0.523 0.503 0 1
Annual % change in number of vessels between 
baseline pre-catch shares and 2013
-8.44 4.82 -16.33 -1.47
Shellfish (dummy) 0.231 0.425 0 1
Quota shares seperable, divisible, and 
transferable (dummy) 0.769 0.425 0 1
16 
 
Due to the possibility that the underlying characteristics of quota markets could influence 
lease prices, three different models specifications were tried: pooled ordinary least squares 
(OLS), fixed quota market effects, and random effects. The pooled OLS model “pools” all of the 
lease price data together under the assumption that there are no unobserved effects from quota 
markets. The fixed and random effects models, in contrast, allow for potential quota market 
effects by incorporating market-specific estimators (fixed effects) along with additional time-
invariant explanatory variables (random effects). A joint F-test of and a Hausman test were then 
used to select the most appropriate of these models. 
 
Allocation Criteria, Allocation Recipients, and Quota Leasing Activity 
Information on how initial allocations were calculated and who they were distributed to 
was obtained largely from the Fishery Management Plan for each program. When necessary, 
additional information was obtained from program reviews, applicable state laws, and the MSA 
(Appendix, Table 6). The fifteen official catch share programs were once again subdivided into 
twenty-four quota markets for analysis due to the segmented structure of several programs. For 
all these markets the criteria used to distribute the initial allocation of shares were determined, 
along with the types of fishery participants that were granted initial shares. In many programs the 
total allocation was split up, and percentages of it were distributed to different fishery 
participants based on different criteria. In the Pacific Shoreside Whiting market, for example, 
80% of the initial allocation was distributed to fishing permit holders based on catch history 
while the remaining 20% went to shoreside processor owners based on processing history. For 
each market, the percentage allocated in each way was then multiplied by the average program 
revenue over the three years prior to catch share implementation (hereafter ‘baseline revenue’). 
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In the above example, $8.2 million out of the $10.2 million in baseline revenue would be 
counted as distributed to permit holders based on catch history, with the remaining $2.0 million 
counted as going to processor owners based on processing history. This revenue weighting was 
done for all twenty-four markets and then summed to roughly estimate the total value of shares 
that have been allocated to the different participants based on the different criteria. 
 Data on quota leasing were obtained mostly from formal program reviews and 
supplemented with NOAA annual reports. Suitable metrics for leasing activity were only 
available from ten of the twenty-four catch share markets. In addition, the specific measure of 
leasing activity often varied between different quota markets. This was usually due to different 
program review authors taking different steps to ensure that only short-term quota pound 
transactions between “arms-length” entities were counted as leasing. In other words, steps to 
ensure that a single quota owner transferring quota pounds from one vessel they own to another 
would not be counted as leasing. For two quota markets, BSAI Crab Rationalization and Pacific 
Shoreside Non-Whiting, leasing data were only available for a subset of the species included in 
the market. However, the proportion of program revenue these species represented was 
substantial, totaling 94% and 67%, respectively. When two or more leasing metrics were 
available for a single quota market, the metric which more conservatively approximated the 






Resource Rent Model Evaluation 
There is reasonable agreement among the pooled OLS, fixed effects, and random effects 
models. Coefficients are identical in sign and similar in magnitude for all parameters (Error! 
Reference source not found.). All specifications display a high level of explanatory power, with 
overall R2 at 0.91 or higher. In the fixed and random effects explanatory power was lower for 
variation in lease prices within the  
same quota market over time compared to variation between different quota markets. However, 
this did not greatly reduce the overall R2 because substantially more variation in lease prices was 
observed between different markets than within the same market. A joint F-test of the fixed 
effects model is highly significant, which suggests the standard errors of the pooled OLS model 
are misspecified (F13,48 = 3.86, p < 0.0003). A comparison of the fixed and random effects 
models using a Hausman test failed to reject the null hypothesis that there is no correlation 
between the unique errors of the fixed effects and the regressors (χ2 = 2.92, p > 0.6643). 
Together these tests indicate the random effects is a more consistent and efficient model than the 
others. 
The log of lease price is positively associated with the log of ex-vessel price and the 
dummy variable for whether landings were greater than 95% of the annual allocation. This is 
consistent with expectations, but the relationship is qualified by a negative interaction between 
the regressors. For most observed ex-vessel prices, lease prices are lower when landings are 
below the 95% threshold. However, for ex-vessel prices above $4.48, there is no significant 
difference in the relationship between lease and ex-vessel prices regardless of the level of 
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landings (Appendix, Figure 7). This result was surprising and may be due to few observations of 
high value species with less than 95% of the allocation landed.  
Table 3. Pooled OLS, fixed quota market effects, and random effects models of logged 
quota lease prices. Parentheses indicate standard errors; * denotes p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 
0.01. 
 
The sign of the coefficient representing fleet consolidation is positive, the opposite of 
expectations. A program exhibiting the average level of consolidation in the sample, an annual 
decrease in the number of vessels by 8.4%, is associated with having 53.5% lower lease prices. 
This result raises questions about the prevailing belief that fleet consolidation under catch shares 
will lower the costs of fishing, improve economic efficiency, and raise resource rents. One 
possible explanation for this unexpected finding is that fleet consolidation could be 
Pooled OLS Fixed effects Random Effects
Dependent variable Logged lease price Logged lease price Logged lease price
Logged ex-vessel price 1.216*** 1.492*** 1.231***
(0.11) (0.38) (0.06)
>95% of allocation landed (dummy) 0.298*** 0.274*** 0.304***
(0.06) (0.09) (0.04)




Annual change in number of vessels 
(% pre-IFQ to 2013)
0.0277*** 0.0267***
(0.007) (0.005)
Shellfish (dummy) 0.137** 0.147**
(0.05) (0.06)




Constant -0.434*** -0.729*** -0.453***
(0.06) (0.10) (0.04)
Observations 65 65 65
Number of programs 14 14 14
R² - within 0.4411 0.4351
R² - between 0.9396 0.9782
R² - overall 0.951 0.9133 0.9508
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simultaneously reducing the number of potential buyers shopping for quota leases, lowering 
demand, and in turn, lowering lease prices. 
Compared to finfish quota markets, shellfish markets are positive and significantly 
associated with lease prices. This result is consistent with previous research from the New 
Zealand individual fishing quota market [28]. These authors theorized the positive relationship 
could be because shellfish standing stock biomass is usually estimated with higher precision, and 
thus the catch rates in these fisheries may be more predictable. Less uncertainty about future 
catch rates should lead to higher quota share prices and higher prices to lease those shares. 
Finally, programs with quota shares that are separable, divisible, and transferrable exhibited a 
marginally significant negative relationship with lease prices (p = 0.07). A possible explanation 
is that greater flexibility in share transfers results in more shares being obtained by fishermen 
who then fish the quota themselves. If more fishermen own the shares for the fish they catch, 
there will be less demand on the short-term leasing market. 
In summary, plausible explanations exist for the unexpected signs on the fleet 
consolidation and share transferability variables. In addition, the consistency and high 
explanatory power across the models suggests that estimating overall resource rent using the 
random effects model is reasonable. Bear in mind, however, that the lease prices used to calibrate 
this model were not collected randomly, but rather were obtained only from the programs that 
collect and publish lease price data. In total, some form of lease data was available from twelve 
of the fifteen programs, including at least one program from each of the six Councils where catch 
shares have been implemented. Resource rent estimates are further limited by the fact that ex-
vessel price, landings, and allocation data were only available for all programs for two years—
2012 and 2013. With these caveats in mind, the average annual resource rent from federal catch 
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share programs at that time is estimated to be $690,000,000 (95% CI [$580,000,000 to 
$820,000,000]). 
The Distribution of Resource Rent 
 Who ultimately receives this rent is poorly understood. It is possible to get a rough 
indication, however, by examining the initial allocations of catch shares and how these privileges 
have been leased over time. The widely held belief that the majority of federal fishing privileges 
were initially allocated based on catch history is confirmed (Error! Reference source not found.). 
Although, seven of the fifteen existing programs did distribute some portion of the initial 
allocation based on criteria other catch history, the real predominance of catch history becomes 
apparent when the percentage allocated by each criterion is weighted by baseline program 
revenue. This weighting methodology does create small discrepancies for some programs where 
shares for different regions or target species were distributed based on different criteria. In the 
Pacific Shoreside Non-Whiting market, for example, quota for non-overfished species were 
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allocated based on catch history, while quota for overfished species were allocated equally 
between all vessels.  
Figure 3. Criteria used to allocate catch shares for existing federal programs, weighted by 
baseline program revenue. 
The lack of separate baseline revenue data for overfished versus non-overfished species 
prevented the analysis from weighting the proportion allocated based on each criterion precisely. 
Instead the relative proportion of revenue from both exploitation groups was assumed to be the 
same today as during the baseline period.  As it stands, the percentage allocated based on catch 
history reported here is believed to be an underestimate of the true percentage. 
 Although the criteria used to allocate catch shares are frequently discussed by proponents 
and critics of these programs, who these shares are ultimately granted to receives less attention.  
This analysis indicates a substantial majority were distributed to vessel or permit owners rather 
than other fishery participants (Error! Reference source not found.). Like allocation criteria, the 
percentage is weighted by baseline program revenue. Also like the allocation criteria, small 
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discrepancies arise because shares for different regions or target species were given to different 
fishery participants in some programs. 
  
Figure 4. Recipients of catch share allocations for existing federal programs, weighted by 
baseline program revenue. 
For the share recipient results, these discrepancies are believed to be small and have little effect 
on the percentages reported. In total, only three of the sixteen existing programs allocated some 
portion of shares to fishery participants other than vessel or permit owners. 
 Since the first federal catch share programs were initiated, there has been limited 
variability over time in the proportion of shares allocated to vessel or permit owners based on 
catch history. Between 1990 and 2004, 88% of shares weighted by baseline revenue were 
allocated based on catch history. From 2005 to present that proportion rose to 93%. For the type 
of fishery participant, the numbers are similar: 89% of shares went to vessel or permit owners 
between 1990 and 2004, while 94% went to the same group from 2005 to present. Comparing 
these proportions over narrower five-year time intervals changes these trends very little. The 
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largest distributions of shares based on criteria other than catch history or granted to participants 
other than vessel or permit owners were in the earliest years of catch shares adoption, 1990-
1994, when the Western Alaska Community Development Quota (CDQ) program distributed 
privileges in several valuable Bering Sea fisheries to six communities of Alaskan natives. Since 
then there has been increasing homogeneity in how initial allocations were calculated and who 
they were distributed to. 
 Although theory suggests initial recipients receive the capitalized value of future rents in 
their initial shares, unforeseen innovation by industry, changes in the health of the fishery, or 
other factors can alter the actual amount of rent that is created. Some of the recipients of current 
rent, however, can be identified by examining quota leasing. In competitive markets, lease prices 
are believed to equal contemporaneous resource rent, so any shareholder who leases at 
competitive prices will capture all of the rent in the transaction. For nine out of the ten quota 
markets leasing activity is greater than 40% in the most recent year with available data (Figure 
5). This suggests absentee shareholders are receiving a substantial portion of the rent with only 
limited exposure to the health and financial risks of fishing. Due to structural differences and 
reporting choices, the exact measure of leasing activity differs among quota markets ( 
Table 4). For each market the best available metric that indicates the percentage of the overall 
allocation or landings that was leased from one owner to a separate “arms-length” entity was 
used. Weighted by program revenue, leasing activity exceeded 56% across these ten markets in 
2013. There is also a statistically significant positive relationship between quota market age and 







Figure 5. Assorted measures of leasing activity for ten of the twenty-five federal quota 
markets. For the specific metric of leasing activity used in each market see Table 4. Note: 
Leasing activity data is available for the Alaska Halibut and Sablefish markets for up to 19 years 
after program implementation. For clarity these additional years are omitted. In both markets, 
however, leasing activity remained at similar levels between year 12 and year 19. 
 
 
Table 4. The definition of leasing activity used in each quota market in Figure 5. 
 
aThe use of hired masters is not technically considered leasing because quota pounds are never transferred. However, 
authors who have examined the practice closely in this program concluded it amounts to de-facto leasing [49] [50] 
[51]. 
Quota Market Measures of leasing activity
Alaska Halibut Proportion of TAC harvested by hired masters
a
 or leased (including medical, beneficiary, and CQE leasing).
Alaska Sablefish Proportion of TAC harvested by hired masters
a
 or leased (including medical, beneficiary, and CQE leasing).
Atlantic Scallop Proportion of TAC leased to 'different owner'.
BSAI Crab IFQ Proportion of TAC leased in the Bristol Bay Red King, Bering Sea Snow and Bering Sea Tanner crab fisheries.
Grouper-Tilefish Proportion of landings by fishermen who do not own quota shares.
Red Snapper Proportion of landings by fishermen who do not own quota shares.
Mid-Atlantic Tilefish Proportion of TAC leased.
Pacific - Non-Whiting
Proportion of TAC leased for Sablefish, Petrale sole, Canary rockfish, and Pacific Ocean Perch (excluding self-
trades and 'other' trades).
Pacific - Whiting Proportion of TAC leased (excluding self-trades and 'other' trades).








Resource Rent Estimation 
The random effects model of quota lease prices indicates catch share resource rent 
averaged $690 million between 2012 and 2013. At this level rent would account for 52% of 
catch share ex-vessel revenues. This percentage lies with the range of values (16% to 61%) 
observed in a comparison of six empirical studies on rent in international programs [52]. The 
random effects results are also in rough agreement with a study on the costs and benefits of 
rebuilding global fish stocks, which estimated resource rent for 144 countries using national-
level revenue, cost, and subsidy data [53]. With these data, resource rent for all US fisheries was 
estimated to be $1,036 million. If the roughly 35% of US landings that are taken in state or 
international waters are then deducted, the rent estimate for landings in federal waters comes 
surprisingly close to the average from the random effects model ($673 million vs $690 million). 
 The random effects model results also compare reasonably well to previous resource rent 
estimates for specific federal catch share programs. Ex-vessel price data and the distribution of 
landings over time at the firm-level were used to model rent in the Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper 
program. Between 2007 and 2010 rent was calculated to be $9.1 million on average [39]. The 
random effects model estimates a slightly lower average for 2012 and 2013, $8.8 million, but this 
lies well within the 95% confidence interval of the other study. In contrast. the random effects 
estimate deviated substantially from a previous estimate for the BSAI Pollock Cooperative 
program. Wilen [30] used anecdotal pollock CDQ lease prices gleaned from “industry insiders” 
to approximate the rent from the offshore sector of this fishery at $500 million in 2001. If 
accurate, this would cast doubt on the random effects estimate for the same year of $140 million. 
However, subsequently published data on the CDQ lease market indicate the “conservative” 
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lease price Wilen used for his calculations, $500 per ton, was nearly double the actual average 
lease price at that time, $262 per ton [54]. With this correction, the random effects model still 
underestimates the direct calculation of rent, but the difference becomes more reasonable.  
 While the resource rent results are mostly consistent with previous estimates, there 
remain additional concerns about their validity. The definition of resource rent applied here—the 
product of average quota lease price and the TAC—is appropriate for fisheries where the TAC is 
fully harvested. However, for several of the multispecies trawl fisheries included in the model 
harvest levels do not exceed even 50% of the TAC. In these programs the limited selectivity of 
trawl gear often results in the TAC for certain bycatch species being reached quickly, which can 
prevent further fishing activity for the remaining allocation of other species. Counting the 
uncaught allocation as rent for the species whose entire TAC cannot be feasibly harvested would 
inappropriately overestimate the actual rent being generated. To adjust for this, resource rent can 
be calculated slightly differently as the product of quota lease price and landings. When done for 
the random effects results, the estimate of total rent drops by 6.5%, to an average of $645 
million.g This moderate decrease suggests that under-harvested species represent a relatively 
small portion of estimated resource rent when using the most commonly applied definition. 
Using the adjusted lower estimate, rent has grown from near zero before catch share 
implementation to comprise 47.3% of total revenues. In comparison, during the same 
management transition total revenues grew by only 3.2% [55]. The growth in resource rent, 
therefore, should be viewed as one of the principal economic changes brought on by catch share 
                                                 
g Deducting uncaught quota does not lead to different conclusions in the program specific comparisons discussed 




implementation, and the distribution of this rent is thus critical to evaluating the economic 
impact of these programs. 
 
Quota Leasing Activity, Initial Allocation Criteria, and Allocation Recipients 
Determining how resource rent is distributed is not an easy task. The extent of quota 
leasing, however, provides a means to quantify the portion of rent going directly to quota 
owners. Results indicate quota leasing activity exceeds 40% of the TAC in nine out of ten 
markets, with a significant positive relationship between lease activity and program age. These 
results are consistent with markets for 33 New Zealand species where the median percentage of 
quota pounds transferred rose from 9% at implementation to 44% after fourteen years of program 
operation [28]. Pinkerton and Edwards [56] [57] documented a similar pattern in the British 
Columbia Halibut fishery, with a steady increase in leasing activity to 57% of the TAC fifteen 
years after implementation. Both studies, however, note flaws in the available measures of 
leasing activity and the same is certainly true for US catch share markets. For example, the 
metric used in the Gulf of Mexico Grouper-Tilefish market—the percentage of landings by 
fishermen who do not own quota shares—likely underestimates the total percentage of landings 
that were leased because leasing by fishermen who own quota for only a portion of their landings 
would not be counted. In contrast, leasing activity in the BSAI Crab IFQ could be overestimated 
if lease rates are lower in the Blue and Golden King crab sectors of the program where leasing 
statistics have not been reported. Potential discrepancies like these are possible in either direction 
for all ten markets included in Figure 5. However, the imprecision in the available data does not 
disprove the fundamental assertion made by Pinkerton and Edwards in British Columbia, and 
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reiterated here for US catch share programs: “leasing is a widespread practice and there is a 
pattern of increase” [57]. 
 This conclusion has important implications for common catch share management 
objectives. Improving workplace safety, for example, is an oft cited benefit of catch shares and a 
stated goal for twelve of the fifteen federal programs. Yet, fishermen leasing quota have been 
observed to take higher risks than non-lessees [58], possibly due to greater financial pressure to 
fish when ex-vessel prices are high but weather conditions may be poor. This phenomenon could 
be contributing to the unchanged fatality rates in several US fisheries despite catch share 
implementation [59]. The promotion of a stewardship ethic is similarly touted as a benefit of 
granting fishermen ownership of perpetual fishing privileges. The logic goes that the value of 
these privileges is linked to the health of the resource, so quota owners are given a financial 
incentive to care for the resource. The practical application of this stewardship is limited, 
however, when owners no longer interact directly with the resource due to leasing [60]. Lessee 
fishers can also face heightened competition from initial recipients of shares in quota markets, 
leading to higher prices and a profit squeeze as more revenue is diverted to cover the cost of 
acquiring fishing privileges [15]. This squeeze can lead to high discard rates and high-grading 
among lessees who try to target higher-value catch to cover their costs [58]. Together, the 
negative effects of leasing on crew safety and resource stewardship have the potential to 
diminish some of the anticipated benefits of catch share implementation, particularly as 
programs age and lease activity increases. 
 The examination of the allocation process in existing federal programs revealed moderate 
variety in the way allocations have determined. Although nearly all programs allocated the 
majority of shares based on catch history, seven programs also incorporated other allocation 
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criteria. Similar variety was noted in an analysis of 158 international catch share programs—
catch history was used as the sole criterion in 54% of programs, and a combination of catch 
history and other criteria were used in an additional 37% [36]. However, differences were 
observed between US and international programs in the use of auctions. On the international 
level, 30% of programs used auctions to distribute some portion of the initial allocation. In 
contrast, no federal programs have used auctions. Due to the substantial number of programs 
analyzed on the international level, however, the allocation mechanisms were only tallied by 
program without considering the proportion of the shares that were actually allocated using each 
mechanism. When proportions were included for federal programs the moderate variety in the 
observed allocation mechanism was replaced with an overwhelming majority of shares being 
allocated based on catch history (90%) and distributed to vessel or permit owners (92%). These 
findings are counter to the recommendations on initial allocations made by the National 
Research Council (NRC). After reviewing previous allocation mechanisms, they recommended: 
“regional councils should avoid taking for granted the option of ‘gifting’ quota shares to the 
present participants in a fishery, just as they should avoid taking for granted that vessel owners 
should be the only recipients and historical participation the only measure of what each 
deserves” [21]. Since then, however, NOAA acknowledges there have been no auctions, taxes, or 
fees for initial allocations [61]and this analysis indicates a higher percentage of initial allocations 
have been distributed based on catch history and granted to vessel and permit owners than before 
the NRC made its recommendations. These decisions have a profound impact on the efficacy of 
catch share programs achieving management objectives. 
 The absence of auctions, taxes, or fees on catch share allocations means that fisheries 
remain one of the only federal resources where no resource rent is retained for the legal owners 
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of the resource, the US public (Table 5). This situation contributes to confusion and the 
prevalent, but flawed, view that the source of “the overfishing problem is the lack of property 
rights” [62]. In fact, fisheries between 3 and 200 nm of the coast have been the property of the 
federal government since the exclusive economic zone was established by the MSA in 1976 [37]. 
Charging for access, under catch shares or another management system, would correct this 
confusion and reinforce the principle that fisheries are resources held in the public trust for the 
benefit of all citizens. The absence of auctions or taxes to capture rent for the public also 
sacrifices a viable source of funding for ecological monitoring or regulatory enforcement. 
Furthermore, granting catch shares in perpetuity creates a powerful group of stakeholders, i.e., 
quota owners, whose interests can then limit the flexibility managers have to address future 
problems. Taking these concerns into account, the US Commission on Ocean Policy 
recommended national guidelines to require catch share programs only assign fishing privileges 
for limited durations and collect mandatory fees for exclusive access [63]. To date, neither of 
these guidelines have been implemented. 




Oil and gas $5.98 billion [64] 
Other extractive resources $1.53 billion [64] 
Timber leases $202 million [65] 
Grazing fees $21 million [66] 
Broadcast spectrum $41.3 billion [67] 
 
Calculating initial allocations using catch history is associated with its own set of 
impacts. Copes and Charles [68] note it rewards those who fished most aggressively in the past, 
regardless of the potential ecological harm they may have caused. At the same time, distributing 
shares based on catch history can discourage conservation behavior in fisheries where a 
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transition to catch shares is anticipated in the future. Increased effort by existing participants and 
speculative entry by new participants have been noted in several programs while they were under 
consideration [69]. Although program designers have generally tried to avoid rewarding this 
behavior by calculating catch history using landings from years before catch shares were 
formally being discussed, it has not eliminated the practice known colloquially as “fishing for 
history.” Anderson et al. [70]  use a theoretical model to counter that grandfathering based on 
catch history is more dynamically efficient than using auctions. Grandfathering, they argue, lets 
industry retain new resource rents and rewards firms for rent-enhancing investment, giving them 
greater incentive to cooperate to increase overall rent. Although the rarity of auctions for fishing 
privileges prevents this argument from being corroborated empirically, evidence from the Gulf 
of Mexico Red Snapper program indicates top harvesters under traditional management would 
rationally resist a transition to catch shares were it not for free allocations based on catch history 
[38].This finding seems to justify the continued use of catch history while simultaneously 
conceding to critics who have long equated the practice to bribery [71]. 
 While the merits of catch history are beginning to be debated on empirical grounds, the 
arguments for granting allocations to vessel or permit owners, rather than other fishery 
participants, remain part philosophical and part practical. The philosophical argument is that 
vessel owners are the participants who have risked their capital and are thus most deserving 
exclusive privileges. This position ignores processors who invested considerable capital in their 
own operations—capital that often becomes redundant when fishing seasons are extended under 
catch shares and all the landings no longer need to be processed at the end of brief fishing 
derbies. It also ignores the health and financial risk experienced non-owner captains and crew 
who perform a dangerous job and are traditionally compensated with a percentage of uncertain 
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net revenues. The practical argument for granting shares to vessel or permit owners is that the 
catch history of other fishery participants is not well documented. The NRC, however, 
considered this argument flawed “because quota could be allocated in equal shares” to captains 
and crew with available participation data [21]. Both of the philosophical and practical 
arguments also neglect the coastal communities that have supported fishing operations. These 
communities are often harmed by the consolidation that commonly accompanies catch share 
adoption, when fewer vessels and fewer fishermen mean fewer customers for area businesses. 
Yet outside Alaska, communities have been entirely left out of initial allocations. 
 The collective consequences of largely granting initial allocations for free based on catch 
history to vessel or permit owners fall largely on the fishery participants left out of quota 
ownership, including the processors, crew, and communities discussed above and future 
generations of fishermen who face the added cost of leasing or buying fishing privileges. This 
new barrier to entry has led to a “graying of the fleet” in some fisheries where the average age of 
vessel owners and quota holders is observed to be growing older [14]. Although this is now an 
emerging issue in the earliest catch share programs, the substantial amount of shares allocated 
based on catch history in the late 1990s suggests it may become a larger problem in the coming 
years ( 
Figure 6). 
 The elevated barrier to entry and further equity concerns can be better understood by 
examining quota share prices. According to economic theory, the price of a quota share should 
reflect the present discounted value of future quota lease payments [28]. Using this relationship, 
the implied discount rate in the seven programs that report share prices is calculated to be 9.51% 





Figure 6. The fishing year used to calculate catch history weighted by baseline program. 
 
overall value of outstanding quota shares in federal catch share programs is approximately $7.25 
billion. This estimate represents the capital the next generation of fishermen will need to raise to 
become full-fledged share owners. If they are unable to do so, the theorized stewardship benefits 
of fishing privilege ownership become even less likely to materialize. To put this quantity in 
perspective, consider that quota shares in the British Columbia catch share system are valued at 
$1.05 billion but pursued by fleets worth only $232 million [72]. Although an analogous 
valuation of US catch share vessels is not available, with the substantial fleet consolidation that 
has occurred [55], the value of quota shares is likely to also exceed the value of the vessels 
operating in US catch share fisheries. Thus, the overcapitalization in fishing vessels and fishing 
that characterized traditional fisheries management has been replaced by overcapitalization in 
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fishing privileges under catch shares that threatens to disrupt the development of the next 




 The estimate produced here suggests the increase in resource rent is perhaps the biggest 
economic change brought on by federal catch share policy and is thus a topic that warrants far 
greater attention. With rent now comprising nearly half of ex-vessel revenues, it is time for 
scholars, policymakers, and broader society to address where they want the rent from fisheries to 
flow. Based on the initial allocation evidence, a substantial part of the rent has already gone to 
vessel and permit owners. Those fortunate enough to have been active during the politically 
determined years used to calculate catch history have been rewarded with enormously valuable 
fishing privileges. Many have since chosen to lease the privileges, and collect the rent, without 
having to endure the inherent risks of fishing. Collectively, then, these findings lend empirical 
support to the negative characterizations many have used to criticize catch share management 
[13] [56] [68] [71] [73]. It did not have to be this way.  
 Many of the concerns associated with grandfathering fishing privileges to vessel and 
permit owners were recognized by the NRC and US Commission on Ocean Policy in their 
separate studies on US catch share policy. Both entities recommended initial allocations be 
distributed to broader groups of fishery participants and that some rent be retained using taxes or 
auctions for the legal owners of federal marine resources, the US government. This has not 
happened. Of further concern is increasing quota leasing in many programs that threatens to 
undermine the theorized safety and stewardship benefits of exclusive fishing privileges. Without 
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significant change it is unclear if catch shares will achieve objectives better than traditional effort 
restrictions going forward. Change could begin by focusing greater attention on the size and 
distribution of rent in existing programs. Inequitable distributions, when identified, can be 
remedied by reclaiming outstanding quota shares through sunsets on existing privileges. 
Reclaimed fishing privileges could then be auctioned, like many other federal resources, or 
reallocated to the fishery participants neglected in initial allocations. The Regional Fishery 
Management Councils already hold the authority to take these actions under the regulations of 
the current MSRA. However, it will take a sharper focus on fisheries rent and the political will to 







Table 6. The quota markets and data sources used for resource rent estimation.  
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Catch Share Quota Market Years Used Lease Price Ex-vessel Price Allocation Landings
Alaska Halibut and Sablefish IFQ
Alaska Halibut 2010-2014 [A] [B] [C] [D] [A] [A]
Alaska Sablefish 2011-2015 [A] [B] [C] [E] [A] [A]
Amendment 80 Non-Pollock Trawl Cooperatives 2011-2014, 2016 [F] [F] [F] [F]
American Fisheries Act (AFA) Pollock Cooperatives
Catcher/Processors 2012-2016 N/A [F] [F] [F]
Catcher Vessels and Motherships 2012-2016 N/A [F] [F] [F]
Atlantic Sea Scallop IFQ 2011-2015 [G] [G] [G] [G]
Atlantic Surfclam and Ocean Quahog IFQ
Atlantic Ocean Quahog 2012-2016 N/A [H] [H] [H]
Atlantic Surfclam 2012-2016 N/A [I] [I] [I]
Bering Sea and Aleutian Islands (BSAI) Crab 
Rationalization
2012-2016 [J] [J] [J] [J]
Central Gulf of Alaska Rockfish Cooperatives 2012-2016 N/A [F] [K] [K] [K]
Gulf of Mexico Grouper-Tilefish IFQ 2012-2016 [L] [L] [L] [L]
Gulf of Mexico Red Snapper IFQ 2012-2016 [M] [M] [M] [M]
Mid-Atlantic Golden Tilefish IFQ 2011-2015 [N] [N] [N] [N]
Northeast Multispecies Sectors 2010-2013 [O] [O] [O] [O]
Pacific Groundfish Trawl Rationalization
Shoreside Whiting 2011-2015 [P] [Q] [P] [P]
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Table 7. Comparison between random effects models using the full dataset (n = 84) and 
only the five most recent years of available data (n = 65). Parentheses indicate standard errors; 





Random Effects Random Effects
Dependent variable Logged lease price Logged lease price
Logged ex-vessel price 1.229*** 1.231***
(0.06) (0.06)
>95% of allocation landed (dummy) 0.282*** 0.304***
(0.03) (0.04)








Shellfish (dummy) 0.0999 0.147**
(0.07) (0.06)







Number of quota markets 14 14
R² - within 0.4351 0.4030
R² - between 0.9782 0.9858
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